Credo in Unum Deum

I Believe in One God

What is Faith?

“Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of
things that appear not.”

Is this a good defininition?
St. Thomas thinks that it is, especially since the Apostle himself gives it. And while the definition is not like a technical definition, St. Thomas contends that it lacks none of the necessary components of a definition. What then is the “substance” of the “substance of things hoped for”? Obviously, it cannot be a substance in terms of the supreme genus as in Aristotelian logic. He says that substance may also be suitably used to indicate the “first beginning of a thing”. Thus it can be said that “the first self-evident principles are the substance of science, because, to wit, these principles are in us the first beginnings of science, the whole of which is itself contained in them virtually.” So then, faith is the first beginning of the things we hope for and do not see. The object of faith then is understood as something unseen, as the second part of the definition says. For what we hope for we do not see, “(Rom. 8:25): ‘We hope for that which we see not’: because to see the truth is to possess it.” 
St Thomas explains “evidence”; that it “is taken for the result of evidence. For evidence induces the intellect to adhere to a truth, wherefore the firm adhesion of the intellect to the non-apparent truth of faith is called ‘evidence’ here. Hence another reading has ‘conviction,’ because to wit, the intellect of the believer is convinced by Divine authority, so as to assent to what it sees not.”
He then goes on to define faith using the form of definition:

Accordingly if anyone would reduce the foregoing words to the form of a definition, he may say that “faith is a habit of the mind, whereby eternal life is begun in us, making the intellect assent to what is non-apparent.”

He further explains,

In this way faith is distinguished from all other things pertaining to the intellect. For when we describe it as “evidence,” we distinguish it from opinion, suspicion, and doubt, which do not make the intellect adhere to anything firmly; when we go on to say, “of things that appear not,” we distinguish it from science and understanding, the object of which is something apparent; and when we say that it is “the substance of things to be hoped for,” we distinguish the virtue of faith from faith commonly so called, which has no reference to the beatitude we hope for.

Therefore, we must next ask what the proper object of faith is.

(All quotes from St. Thomas are from his Summa Theologica, Treatise on Theological Virtues, Question 4, Article 1.)


June 12, 2008 Posted by | Catholicism, Controversial, Philosophy, Protestantism, Religion | Leave a comment

Why is there something rather than nothing?

Yeah, that’s the old question.  The erudite snicker, and hand wave.  But that just tells me they don’t want to answer it.  And how is it that the only possible answer to that question is non-existent?  Is that even possible?

May 19, 2008 Posted by | Philosophy | Leave a comment

The Beauty of Goodness and the Goodness of Beauty

Now I am sure that I have heard that before, but I can’t quite remember where… maybe in Adler’s “The Six Great Ideas”.  But I got to thinking about that as I listened to “The Wisdom of Father Brown” this morning during my commute.  I had a startling rediscovery— that is, I have realized this before, but for whatever reason, it had a special kick this time.  I don’t know what either of those things are, and that is troubling.  Sure, it may be like unto the High Court’s definition of pornography: “It’s hard to define it, but you know it when you see it”.  Now it may seem rather to display my utter un-knowledge by using the definition of porn to describe my understanding of Beauty and Goodness, and if you think so I must concur.  But it is nevertheless the most accurate way I can describe my knowledge of Goodness and Beauty.  I know that the one is something that is Good, and I know that the other is quite Beautiful.

How is it that we have gotten to the point in history where only the learned know what they mean by Good and Beautiful and even they don’t have the slightest clue?  For they call the Cathedral bad and ugly, and the woman’s choice for unlife good and beautiful.  The ugly and mean are praised for being daring, and the daring Dogmatist is ugly and mean.  The liberation of women and minorities is good and just, but the Liberation of the same from the oppressive liberators is evil and unjust.

What can be done?  I think bad, old Catholic Theology has something to offer.  Go to Mass, pray your Rosary, and venerate some Sacred Images.  In the Mass, you see and taste the slain and risen Lord, yet only dimly as through an accidental veil.  In the Rosary, you witness the Goodness and Justice of our Lord.  In Sacred Images, you see the Beauty of the Faith in the lives of the Saints.  In the Mass, we experience the Goodness of God in our right and just worship of Him as we lift up our hearts above to be filled with His Goodness and Beauty so that we may then have our hearts poured out with the Goodness and Beauty of Christ to a world that does not know it.

Now, have I been using Goodness and Beauty with absolute univocity?  No.  I have been analogical in my usage and the blending of the two uses can be confusing.  However, since I do not know what really Beauty and Goodness are, and since I imagine that most anyone who is reading this does not really know either, I am offering what I think is the best way to actually begin to glimpse what these two “great ideas” are.  I don’t know how we are to know what they are without a firm dedication to our Lord.

April 3, 2008 Posted by | Catholicism, Philosophy | Leave a comment

Evolution, Science and Philosophy

I am currently in a discussion about evolution with a self-proclaimed atheist.  There are a number of things that this little dialog has taught me or confirmed to me, but I’ll try to stick to just a few.

First, I am constantly awed by the fact the atheist-evolutionist is completely unaware of the fact that he has philosophical presuppositions that can be challenged and which have a essential bearing on his belief in atheistic evolution.

Second, I am just not trained to argue these facts.  It is really almost as bad as two self-proclaimed Bible experts (that is, they read it prayerfully) at the local community Bible church slinging the greek around with authority when neither of them have had a day a greek in their life (oh they have a concordance and interlinear text) and the authorities they rely on have barely a better education themselves.  Frankly, I grow weary of the fact bomb tossing which then each side has to defuse and then lob another bomb back or just run away and let it explode with no harm done (that means just pretend it was never thrown in terms of response).  I just don’t know enough about science to tell this guy that his radio-metrical-cyber-pulsar dating method is crap.  I just don’t know.  I say that scientist X says it is faulty and the radio-metrical-cyber-pulsar daters cheat on the numbers, and he’ll say the Dr. X was fulla crap and didn’t do his research because facts a, b, c.  Yeah, and I am gonna say what?  “Everybody knows pulsars don’t date ugly dudes like you”?  What?

Third, a lot of these guys haven’t heard the news that Logical Positivism was annihilated 50 years ago.  But they have combined it with a fierce anti-realism.  My new friend told me that science is about predicting what will happen in nature.  It is not supposed to tell us anything with certainty.  What!?!

Fourth, I am offended for Science by these guys.   What happened to the bad old days when religion and science worked together and when we believed that Science could give us positive knowledge of the nature of things?  Don’t it make you pine for the past?  But you probably want an Old Latin Mass too, you filthy dark-aged ogre.

Fifth, and finally for now, I think that, for me anyway, philosophy is the only way to converse with these guys.  Logic governs the reasoning of all the disciplines.  Philosophy can assess the unspoken and un-understood assumptions that our atheist-evolutionist holds to.  So that is the route I have taken.  Fine if there ain’t no God out there, that means this universe is eternal.  Go Kalam and the smack is laid down… gently of course. 

March 26, 2008 Posted by | Philosophy, Religion, Science | 2 Comments

External World Scepticism and Natural Law

I have been in conversation with a friend of mine who is delving deeply into the debate over external world scepticism (EWS) and whether it can be adequately defeated without any question begging.  I am wondering about the fate of Natural Law and the certainty we have of its reality and moral claim on our lives, if as our sceptical frineds say, our choice to not be EWS is purely pragmatic.  It seems that Natural Law only follows from our pragmatic belief in an external world… in which case objective, absolute ethics honestly go out the window.One way out is to have an a priori argument for the existence of God.  This would surely close the discussion, but too many folks, especially Theists (?), are sceptical (?)… “It’s too easy, too good to be true” is the common retort… Personally, I dig Anselm’s proof, and the Bonaventurian, Scotistic, von Hildebrandian, and finally Seifertian developments to it.  That isn’t to say that I understand it even partly, but what I know about it, seems to be our best bet.Thoughts… that’s all. 

January 23, 2008 Posted by | Philosophy | Leave a comment

On the Inadequacies of the Written Word over the Oral Word

Plato argues that, contrary to popular opinion, the written word is inferior to the oral word. There are six reasons that Plato gives.

1. Writing Does Not Increase Either the Wisdom or the Memory of Human Beings. Saith Socrates:

Then anyone who leaves behind him a written manual and likewise anyone who takes it over from him, on the supposition that such writing will provide something reliable and permanent, must be exceedingly simple-minded; he must really be ignorant of Ammon’s utterance if he imagines that written words can do anything more than remind one who knows what the writing is concerned with.

2. Writing Is Incapable of Helping and Defending Itself on Its Own and Needs the Intervention of Its Author. He continueth:

You know, Phaedrus, that’s the strange thing about writing, which makes it truly analogous to painting. The painting’s products stand before us as though they were alive, but if you question them, they maintain a most majestic silence. It is the same with written words; they seem to talk to you as though they were intelligent, but if you ask them anything about what they say … they go on telling you just they same thing forever. And once a thing is put in writing, the composition, whatever it may be, drifts all over the place, getting into the hands not only of those who understand it, but equally of those who have no business with it; it doesn’t know how to address the right people and not address the wrong. And when it is ill-treated and unfairly abused it always needs its parent to come to its help, being unable to defend or help itself.

3. The Reasons for the Superiority of Oral Discourse over Writing. And thus moreth:

Socrates: But now tell me, is there another sort of discourse which is brother of written speech, but of unquestioned legitimacy? Can we see how it originates, and how much better and more effective it is than the other?

Phaedrus: What sort of discourse have you in mind, and what is its origin?

Socrates: The sort that goes together with knowledge, and is written in the soul of the learner, that can defend itself, and knows to whom it should speak and to whom it should say nothing.

Phaedrus: You mean no dead discourse, but the living speech, the original of which the written discourse may fairly be called a kind of image.

Socrates: Precisely.

4. The “Playfulness” of Written Discourse and the “Seriousness” of Oral Discussion. Furthermoreth (and this is quite longeth):

Socrates: Now tell me this. Would a sensible husbandman, who has seeds which he cares for and which he wishes to bear fruit, plant them with serious purpose in the heat of summer in some garden of Adonis, and delight in seeing them appear in beauty in eight days, or would he do that sort of thing, when he did it at all, only in play and for amusement? Would he not … follow the rules of husbandry, plant his seeds in fitting ground, and be pleased when those which he had sowed reached their perfection in the eighth month?

Phaedrus: Yes, Socrates, he would, as you say act in that way when in earnest and in the other way only for amusement.

Socrates: and are we to maintain that he who has knowledge of what is just, honorable, and good has less sense than the farmer in dealing with his seeds?

Phaedrus: Of course not.

Socrates: Then it won’t be with serious intent that he “writes them in water” or that black fluid we call ink, using his pen to sow words that can’t either speak in their own defense or present the adequately.

Phaedrus: It certainly isn’t likely.

Socrates: No, it is not. He will sow his seed in literary gardens, I take it, and write when he does write by way of pastime, collecting a store of refreshment both for his own memory, against the day “when age oblivious comes,” and for all such as tread in his footsteps, and he will take pleasure in watching the tender plants grow up.And when other men resort to other pastimes, regaling themselves with drinking parties and suchlike, he will doubtless prefer to indulge in the recreation I refer to.

Phaedrus: And what an excellent one it is, Socrates.

Socrates: Yes indeed, dear Phaedrus. But far more excellent, I think, is the serious treatment of them, which employs the art of dialectic. The dialectician selects a soul of the right type, and in it he plants and sows his words founded on knowledge, words which can defend themselves and him who planted them, words which instead of remaining barren contain a seed whence new words group up in new characters, whereby the seed is vouchsafed immortality, and its possessor the fullest measure of blessedness that man can attain.

5. The Clarity and Completeness That Belong to Oral Discussion but Not to Written Discourses. Still more cometh:

Socrates: But the man who thinks that in the written word there is necessarily much that is playful, and that no written discourse … deserves to be treated very seriously (and this applies also to the recitations of the rhapsodies, delivered to sway people’s minds, without opportunity for questioning and teaching), but that the best of them really serve only to remind us of what we know; and who thinks that only words about justice and beauty and goodness spoken by teacher for the sake of instruction and really written in a soul is clearness the speaker’s own legitimate offspring, first the word within himself, if it be found there, manner in the souls of other , -that man, Phaedrus, is likely to be such as youu and I might pray that is what I wish and pray for.

6. The Philosophical Writer Does Not Entrust to Written Works “the Things of Greatest Value”. And finallyeth:

Socrates: Then we may regard our literary pastime as having reached a satisfactory conclusion. Do you now go and tell Lysias that we two went down to the stream where is the holy place of the nymphs, and there listened to words which charged us to deliver a message, first to Lysias and all other composers of discourses, secondly to Homer and all others who have written poetry whether to be read or sung, and thirdly to Solon and all such as are authors of political compositions under the name of laws- to wit, that if any of them has done his work with a knowledge of the truth, can defend his statements when challenged, and can demonstrate the inferiority by a name drawn from those written works, but by one that indicates his serious pursuit.

Phaedrus: Then what names would you assign him?

Socrates: To call him wise, Phaedrus, would, I think, be going too far; the epithet is proper only to a god. A name that would fit him better, and have more seemliness, would be “lover of wisdom,” or something similar.

Phaedrus: Yes, that would be quite in keeping.

Socrates: On the other hand, one who has nothing to show of more value than the literary works on whose phrases he spends hours, twisting them this way and that, pasting them together and pulling them apart, will rightly, I suggest, be called a poet or speech writer or law writer.

Phaedrus: Of course.

Food for thought! Also notice the implications for the Protestant notion of Sola Scriptura. Yeah… doesn’t look so good.

January 4, 2008 Posted by | Philosophy | Leave a comment

Toward a New Interpretation of Plato

Giovanni Reale is the author of this little book of just over 400 pages.  The outlandish concept of the this book is that Sola Scriptura stinks… whether it’s in Christianity or Plato studies.  The traditional paradigm established by Schleiermacher relies on the maxim that “the dialogues have a value taken on their own and so are self-sufficient, in the sense that Plato’s thought can be found in them.” (39)  Of course, there are a couple other points in the Schleiermacherian paradigm, but I want to deal very briefly with this one.  This paradigm totally dismisses the unwritten doctrines of Plato as the subjective and probably inaccurate interpretations of what Plato thought and taught and wrote.  Therefore, he rejects any of the oral tradition about Plato as irrelevant to the task of reconstructing Plato’s thought.

The task of this book is to actually recover this tradition and rely more heavily on the Unwritten Doctrines.  Reale claims that the current reading of Plato has led to unresolvable problems in Plato Scholarship and the paradigm is utterly broken.  Plato himself says that the most important things he knows are not to be written down because the medium of writing is not fit for such a lofty and high subject.  Plato left that to the oral discourse.  There is also the testimony of Aristotle.  In the Metaphysics (I think… or maybe it was the Physics… crap!) Aristotle expounds on Plato doctrines.  But 2/3 of what he expounds are to be found nowhere in Plato’s dialogs!  Now we know that we have everything Plato wrote (and more!).  So if Aristotle is conversing with Plato at the level of Unwritten Doctrines (which he refers to), then they must be important.

Too long already, but I wholeheartedly recommend this book.  It is utterly fascinating and the promises made if the paradigm works are the best thing since… the last best thing there was.

November 1, 2007 Posted by | Philosophy | Leave a comment

Protagorian Relativism: Plato and Aristotle Respond

“Man is the measure of all things, of the things that are, that they are, and of the things that are not, that they are not.”(1) Plato’s actual words in the mouth of Socrates are, “[Y]ou know that he [Protagoras] puts it something like this, that as each thing appears to me, so it is for me, and as it appears to you, is for you—you and I each being a man?”(2)

Plato and Aristotle attacked vigorously this statement because it seemed to make objective knowledge impossible; that is, we cannot know truly the way things are and therefore cannot philosophize about the nature of things. What we are left with is a world which seems to me to be a certain way, but may seem to you to be a different way. But that’s okay.

Plato and Aristotle went about dismantling this idea by asking whether this doctrine applied to itself. That is, if a is true for me and a is false for you, then it seems that a is both true and false at once! Applied to Protagoras’ maxim, the maxim refutes itself since if it is true it is false.

In his book, The Presocratic Philosophers, Jonathan Barnes contends that this objection by Plato and Aristotle does not really work in that it misapprehends what Protagoras was actually trying to say. For example, Barnes contends that Protagoras is not guilty of advancing a self-refuting premiss since the argument suggests that when I judge something to be the case as it appears to me, I am judging correctly. Of course, I cannot misjudge the contents of my judgments. Therefore, if I judge that the wind is cold for me I am judging correctly. Also, since Protagoras believes that, “[f]or any proposition P there is an argument for P and an argument of equal strength for not-P”(3), even a supposed mathematical certainty could be questioned and its negation shown to be as likely as its assertion, as when he, according to Aristotle, “refuted the geometers.”(4)

But this is all sophistry. Shall we commit it to the flames? If knowledge is private and not public, then it seems to me that Protagoras’ epistemology doesn’t really even get off the ground. Sure, we may not be contradicting one another strictly when we report our subjective judgmental “seemings” (I judge that A seems to be, or is, R for me), but then what really does Protagoras have to say to me? I have no reason to listen to him or adopt his epistemology especially since there are just as good reasons to reject his epistemology, according to his own argument. So it appears that while Plato and Aristotle might (maybe, just maybe, but I doubt it) have misapprehended Protagoras’ position, the strength in their refutation lies in its public, objective status. Of course, if truth is unknowable in an absolute sense, then we are all on equal footing. But if it is knowable, then Protagoras needs to rework his epistemology.

1 McInerny, Ralph. “A History of Western Philosophy.” 1963: University of Notre Dame Press. <;

2 Levett, M. J., rev. Burnyeat, Myles. “Theaetetus.” Plato: Complete Works. Ed. John M. Cooper. Hackett Pub. Co., Inc.: Indiana, 1997. 169

3 Barnes, Jonathan. The Presocratic Philosophers. London and New York: Routledge, 1982. 545

4 Ibid. 546

September 4, 2007 Posted by | Philosophy | Leave a comment

C. L. Stevenson on “The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms”— a Review and Critique

The first point that I would like to make is a preliminary point and not vital to the discussion of Stevenson’s metaethical theory. I think it is important to note however. There is a deafening silence by Stevenson on what anybody before Hobbes had to contribute to anything philosophical. There are fleeting references to Plato but usually with some sort of disdain; and when the disdain is absent there seems to be little appreciation of him. But I have looked for in vain even a veiled reference to Sts. Augustine, Anselm, Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure, Bl. John Duns Scotus, etc. It seems that although one may reject metaphysics completely, there could still be something to be gleaned by these tremendous thinkers. I believe that the lack of reference to their philosophical adversaries prove that they have not in fact read these philosophers, or if they have, it was only the brief sections their philosophy professors had them read (as I did in undergraduate work in a Philosophy of Religion class where the professor assigned the class certain bits from Anselm and Thomas Aquinas on arguments for God’s existence but did not give a fair treatment of either philosopher’s position). So much for my preliminary remark.

My objective in these first two paragraphs was only to bring out in the open the overt disdain for the past which accompanies the Modern Eschatology which asserts that Man has finally come of age and thrown off the shackles of Divine Religion and now Reason may rule supreme and finally we will be able to answer all the questions we have been unable to answer because religious superstition often impeded if not totally blocked scientific progress (See Carnap and his buddies). It seems no little surprise that ethics suffered at the hand of these (ir)Rational Messiahs no less than metaphysics and epistemology did. But now to summarize and evaluate Stevenson’s view that ethical terms have only an emotive meaning.

Stevenson starts by wondering how we can discover the meaning behind ethical questions. ‘Is X good?’ is a difficult question because, he says, we do not know quite what we are looking for. He suggests that we should engage in an experiment of substitution. But this substitution must be relevant to the question we are asking. For example, he says that ‘Is X pink with yellow trimmings?’ cannot be substituted for ‘Is X good?’ So what have been the ways which previous philosophers have attempted to give a relevant definition of “good”? (Here we see the disdain for what has been said so much more thoroughly in the past.)
‘The word “good” has often been defined in terms of approval, or similar psychological attitudes. We may take as typical examples: “good” means desired by me (Hobbes); and “good” means approved by most people (Hume, if effect). It will be convenient to refer to definitions of this sort as “interest theories”… Are definitions of this sort relevant?’

He claims that these definitions are only partially relevant. There seems to be something lacking in the definitions; namely, they overlook the ‘“vital” sense of “good”.’ But what then constitutes the “vital” sense of good? Well, although this is a very tricky question, but he says that there are a few requirements that have come to be expected of the term.

1 ‘We must be able to disagree intelligently about whether [X] is “good”.’ With Hobbes’ definition, it is impossible to for us to disagree. Let us put forth a statement and then apply substitution to see why this is so. I say ‘X is good’ and you reply, ‘That’s not so, X is not good”; I say, ‘I desire X’ and you reply ‘That’s not so, I do not desire X’. It is easy to see that we cannot disagree in our reporting of our subjective desires. There is no contradiction involved here.

2 ‘[The] “goodness” [of X] must have, so to speak, a magnetism.’ That is to say, if I see that X really is good, the “goodness” of X should “move” me to act in the direction that X is pointing me to act. This ability to move me in the direction that X points should be stronger that it was before I believed that X is good. This excludes Hume’s definition, for I may recognize that the majority of folks think that, let’s say, contraception is good. However, there is nothing that prevents me from disagreeing with that and in fact having a stronger “moving” to not contracept.

3 ‘The “goodness” of anything must not be verifiable solely by the use of the scientific method. “Ethics must not be psychology.” This rules out all of the traditional interest theories, without exception.’ This is an extreme claim, at least in its exclusionary powers. Stevenson says that we need to ‘examine its plausibility.’ If accept Hobbes’ definition, I can prove my judgment by showing that I am not mistaken about my desires. If Hume, I may take a vote to show that the majority do in fact believe that X is good. Thus, this third principle rules out the traditional interest theories entirely.

So much for interest theories. What does Stevenson have to offer as an alternative to the traditional interest theories?

Continue reading

July 21, 2007 Posted by | Philosophy | 1 Comment

Rudolf Carnap and Protestantism

As I consider Rudy C’s Theory of Frameworks, I can’t help but wonder if maybe he was a Protestant- even though he eschewed metaphysics and religion in general.  But really, his theory of frameworks involves so much subjectivism that it is hard not to make the connection.  How shall we talk about the world without using words that refer to entities or universals which do not have any real existence? he asks us.  Well, we can still use those terms without ascribing real existence to them.  They are merely terms of expedience which may render more fruitful our scientific pursuits.  Now that is the key.  Scienctific advancement is the highest good- of course, I don’t mean “good” in the sense that “goodness” is a really existing idea, I must be using it for its expedience and fruitfulness in conveying to you what our god is… woops… well you get the really existing non-existent point.  The existential problem I have with Carnap is that he seems to believe that he has said something really important.  His rejection of metaphysics (well, mainly his rejection of God) led him and his collegues in the positivist movement into some really weird parts of the thought world.  And they thought that they were really saying something important to and for the world.  Insane.

Well, how does this relate to Protestantism?  I mean, Protestants have not generally rejected metaphysics or religion.  But the relativism and subjectivism and use of theology for its expediency or fruitfulness and just an in general utilitarian attitude toward dogmatic truth is what made the connection for me.  I am also aware that there are those who are very dogmatic (even without warrant- like I was when I was Protestant) about distinctly “Christian” belief and morals.  Now, there is absolutely no argument in the world, aside from a psychological argument (the famous Argument from Feelings used by so many Christian philosophers down through the ages… wait……), for the truth of Protestantism.  Now, the same holds for Rudy C’s Theory of Frameworks, aside from the Argument from Perceived Expediency and Fruitfulness (also used by countless great thinkers since Socrates… wait……).  And the funny (read “sad”) thing is that Protestants think they have something salvifically important to say to and for the world.  What is the gospel?  “Believe the Gospel and you will be saved,” says our Founder, Jesus.  OK.  Tell me what is that gospel.   What did Jesus mean by that?  It seems that this must be the central message of Christianity.  Believe this and you will be saved.

I don’t know how many versions I heard while I was Protestant.  Nor how many times I heard from other Protestants that Pastor so-and-so didn’t even understand the gospel, or I didn’t understand the gospel because he or I was Arminian or Calvinist.  So you see, it is quite sad to see Protestants giving the “gospel” to people when they have not come to agree on what the content of the gospel is.  And if they are not giving the gospel that the Apostles handed down, then, and this follows inescapably, they are giving a different gospel.  And Paul pronounces an anathema upon them.

Now I am sarcastic often.  But I have friends and family that are Protestant who claim to know the gospel and pass judgment on others whom they say do not understand or even know what the gospel is.  It does truly sadden me.  I mock not them, only the beliefs they hold.  I think we can legitimately do that.  Lets remember to attack ideas and not people.  But in this case, it is hard because of the statements and self-understanding of these Protestants who think they have something salvifically important to say to and for the world.  I hate their ideas, and weep for the people.  Jesus died to save them.  I pray that they are indeed saved in the end.

 I have also previewed here just a little of where my next entry On The Difference Between Catholicism and Protestant (PART III) will be going. 

July 17, 2007 Posted by | Philosophy, Religion | Leave a comment


I have here a great link for those interested in philosophy; especially the philosophy of Dietrich von Hildebrand and other phenomenologist thinkers like Josef Seifert. I am currently reading from that site “Certitude and Contuition. St. Bonaventure’s Contributions to the Theory of Knowledge” by Kateryna Fedoryka. It is especially interesting after having read a selection from the fourth question of his Quaestionae Disputatae de Scientia Christi―namely, “Is whatever we know for certain known in the eternal reasons themselves?”  His theory of illumination is most enlightening.  I feel like I knew it all along―almost like I couldn’t help but know it.  Sorry.  Actually that is not the correct way to read what he says about contuition.  I will write later on this topic after I finish pondering  Fedoryka’s treatment.

June 19, 2007 Posted by | Philosophy | Leave a comment